Commentary on two papers on education and crime in urban neighborhoods by Derek Neal




Steven Levitt makes a set of interesting observations
concerning changes in the relationship between a given
individual’s income and the likelihood that he is a crime
victim. The relationship between income and crime vic-
timization is important because it contributes to overall
inequality among our citizens. Work on this topic is timely
because the measures of wages, earnings, and wealth that
serve as our standard yardsticks of individual prosperity
indicate that outcomes in our society have become less
equal in recent decades. Levitt’s main thesis contains two
parts. First, he argues that property crime has become more
concentrated among poor households. Second, he contends
that violent crime has not become more concentrated
among the poor and, in fact, he shows that murder—at
least in one large city—may have become less concentrated
among the poor.
Levitt argues that these preliminary results do
not add much to our understanding of how the distribution of
individual welfare has changed over time because we cannot
observe what individuals spend in order to avoid crime.
His argument is correct, and I admire his reluctance to
jump to unwarranted conclusions. Here, I comment on
his initial findings and pay particular attention to the
results concerning the increasing concentration of prop-
erty crime among the poor.
I begin by noting that in the National Crime
Victimization Survey (NCVS) data, there is really no
obvious pattern in the relative exposure of rich and poor
families to violent crime. Aggravated assault has clearly
become relatively more common among black families
with incomes of more than $50,000, but no similar
results appear for robbery or aggravated assault among
whites. Furthermore, the homicide results from Chicago
indicate that murder became less concentrated in neigh-
borhoods with low median incomes over the 1965-95
period. But the results do not make clear the degree to
which murder actually became relatively less common
among poor families in Chicago. A comparison of the
1970 and 1990 results in Levitt’s Table 7 shows that the
relationship between community characteristics and
community homicide rates is remarkably similar in the
two periods once all the community characteristics are
included in the regression. Thus, the change in the correlation
between median family income and homicide rates may
simply reflect different patterns of mixing by income
across communities.
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My main point is that the evidence on changes in
the incidence of violent crime is far from clear cut, while
the evidence on the incidence of property crime is clear,
consistent, and striking. For both auto theft and burglary,
victimization rates among the poor rose relative to the
rates among the rich. Furthermore, although burglary
rates fell in all groups, the decline among the rich is
much greater than the decline among the poor. For both
blacks and whites, the ratio of burglary rates among the
poor to burglary rates among the rich increased by more
than two-thirds. Moreover, the levels of change in these
victimization rates are quite impressive. All groups saw
the annual probability of burglary victimization for a
household fall by at least 2 percentage points, and rich
blacks actually enjoyed a decline of more than 8 percentage
points. In addition, for both races, the excess decline in
burglary victimization rates for rich versus poor white
families was more than 3 percentage points.
These seem like big numbers to me, especially
given that the expected losses associated with burglary
victimization should be larger for rich households than for
poor households. If the expected loss for a rich family is
even $1,000 per burglary, the 8-percentage-point reduction
among rich black families represents an expected savings of
$80 per year in the direct costs of burglary alone, and this
figure does not even take into account the time costs or the
nonpecuniary costs of victimization. As a check on these vic-
timization numbers, I would be interested to know whether
or not the patterns of victimization reported in the NCVS
provide any insights into trends in the cost of property
insurance over the same time period.
 Levitt argues that the NCVS numbers may
reflect a combination of improvements in crime avoidance
technologies and more intensive use of these technologies
among rich families. I have no quarrel with this conjecture,
but I do believe that a complete analysis of these trends
requires data on patterns of residential segregation and
crime. We read a fair amount in magazines and newspapers
about “gated communities.” However, I do not think we
really understand the role of residential segregation in
determining crime trends or trends in the relative victimi-
zation of rich and poor.
DOWNES AND FIGLIO
Thomas Downes and David Figlio provide an interesting
survey of a relatively recent but rapidly growing literature
on school finance reform. Because this literature deals with
the relationship between government policies and the dis-
tribution of investments in human capital, it addresses
some of the most important issues in modern research on
inequality. The authors also include two sets of results from
their own research. I will not provide a detailed commentary
on the entire literature that Downes and Figlio review.
Rather, I will focus my attention on their results and on a
specific debate over methodology that is ongoing in this
literature.
Their results in Table 1 indicate that in states
where some type of equalization reform occurred
between 1970 and 1990, relatively high-spending districts
experienced relative reductions in the fraction of residents
who have college degrees. The authors interpret this as
evidence that well-educated parents leave high-spending
districts when reforms restrict the ability of these districts to
spend more than other districts. 
The results in Table 2 examine the fraction of
both public and private school students in central cities
who come from families with high incomes or families
with household heads who are college graduates. Downes
and Figlio report that relative to central cities that are not
affected by reforms, central cities that are included in
equalization plans experience increases in the fraction of
students from high-income or high-education homes.
This is true for public school and private school students,
but especially for private school students. The authors
offer the following interpretation of the results in the
tables: “The evidence is wholly consistent with the notion
of highly educated families moving to central cities in
response to school finance reforms and sending their
children to private schools.”
This scenario is only one of many that could be
constructed to rationalize the numbers in the tables. It is
possible that urban public schools gain students from two
sources in response to equalization reforms. First, they
could acquire some middle- and low-income students
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absence of reform. These students could be small in number
relative to the public school population yet still represent
a substantial portion of the urban private school population.
Second, urban public schools could acquire a larger number
of children from high-income families who would have
migrated to the suburbs in the absence of  reform. Given
the relatively small size of the private school sector, these
two effects could yield what we observe in Table 2—
namely, modest increases in the fraction of urban public
school students who come from high-income homes and
large increases in the fraction of urban private school
students who come from high-income homes. 
I do not offer this scenario as the correct explanation
for the results in Table 2, but rather as one of many that
are equally plausible and yet indistinguishable based on
the evidence that the authors present. This type of difference-
in-difference analysis of composition measures will never
provide clear answers to questions concerning patterns
of residential mobility in response to reform changes.
Composition changes in central cities alone cannot be
used to pin down changes in the number of families that
make specific types of choices concerning schooling and
location.
However, I am more concerned about another
methodological issue. Downes and Figlio, and many others
who work on this topic, commonly employ an event-
study approach. This approach treats all reforms as an
occurrence of a specific and common event. In this frame-
work, states or localities that have not experienced formal
reforms serve as a control group, while those that have
experienced reforms constitute the treatment group. The
goal is to evaluate the average effects of reform (the treat-
ment) on various outcomes. Downes and Figlio acknowledge
that there are problems with using the event-study
approach to evaluate school finance reforms, and I commend
them for raising these important issues. However, we
differ in our evaluation of the importance of these problems. I
am firmly convinced that the event-study method is not
appropriate for research on school finance reforms. A recent
paper by Caroline Hoxby (1998) demonstrates that school
finance equalization reforms are incredibly heterogeneous
events. The changes in tax and expenditure regulations
that accompany these reforms vary greatly among states,
and the effects of these reforms on the incentives faced by
local school districts vary significantly within and among
states. No sensible economic model would ever predict
that such varied reforms would yield similar impacts, and
I am not sure that we learn much about how these
reforms work or how an optimal reform should be
designed by estimating the average impact of such a var-
ied set of interventions.
The details are important here. Future research
should focus on pinning down exactly how various features of
school finance reforms affect the incentives and behavior
of schools, parents, and students. Hoxby has taken the
first step down this road. Others should follow her lead.
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